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THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS: RULES IN 
SEARCH OF HARMONIZATION 
NEIL B. COHEN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Based on the evidence of almost two decades, it seems likely that the secured 
transactions revolution that began over a half-century ago with the promulgation 
and widespread enactment of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code will 
continue apace in the twenty-first century. For several decades before the turn of 
the twenty-first century, the revolution did not extend much beyond the United 
States and the Anglophone provinces of Canada, but that changed significantly 
in the new millennium. Much of this progress can be attributed to the work of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL” or the 
“Commission”), which has been engaged in projects relating to secured 
transactions since 1995. 
The first UNCITRAL project resulted in the United Nations Convention on 
the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (the Receivables 
Convention). The Convention has not yet gone into force, having been signed 
only by three States1 and acceded to only by Liberia.2 It has, however, been 
submitted to the United States Senate for its Advice and Consent3 and is before 
the Senate at this writing.4 
 
Copyright © 2018 by Neil B. Cohen. 
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        * Jeffrey D. Forchelli Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Preparation of this article was 
supported by a Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Grant. The author served as a member of the 
delegation of the United States to the UNCITRAL Working Groups that prepared the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Secured Transactions. The views expressed in this article, however, are those of the author 
and should not be taken as those of the United States. 
 1.  See Status: United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade,  
U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L. [UNCITRAL], http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_ 
texts/security/2001Convention_receivables_status.html [https://perma.cc/TDD4-JXHP] (last visited Dec. 
13, 2017) (showing Luxemburg, Madagascar, and the United States of America are the only States which 
have currently signed). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  See Barack Obama, Message to the Senate – The UN Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade (Feb. 10, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/02/10/message-senate-un-convention-assignment-receivables-international-trade 
[https://perma.cc/9PF3-GJCF].  
 4.   On March 20, 2018, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to report the Receivables 
Convention favorably to the full Senate. See U.N. Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade, Hearing on Treaty Doc. 114-7 before S. Foreign Relations Comm., 115th Cong. 
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The negotiations that led to the Receivables Convention were difficult. Many 
participants sought to create a uniform regime for assignments of receivables, 
whether outright or for security,5 that would provide uniform substantive rules 
for the creation, third-party effectiveness, and priority of such assignments, as 
well as the effect of assignments of receivables on the account debtors. While the 
Commission reached consensus on a number of substantive rules regarding the 
effect of assignments of receivables on the account debtors, consensus proved 
elusive with respect to substantive rules for third-party effectiveness and priority. 
The result was a “second best” of sorts, with a uniform set of conflict of laws rules 
to determine which State’s law is to govern those matters.6 
While the Receivables Convention did not accomplish all that was hoped, and 
it still has not gone into effect, the ability of UNCITRAL to obtain consensus as 
to at least some matters related to secured transactions led to a decision by the 
Commission to further pursue work in the field. In the last decade and a half, 
UNCITRAL has produced a Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions7 (with a 
supplement devoted to security rights in intellectual property8), a Guide on the 
Implementation of a Security Rights Registry,9 and most recently, a Model Law 
on Secured Transactions10 and a guide to its enactment.11 
The text of the Model Law achieves a remarkable degree of substantive 
harmonization to create a model legal regime that adopts a very thoughtful 
version of the modern notice-filing based secured transactions systems that were 
the focus of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in the United 
States, the subject of refinement in Canada in the development of its Personal 
Property Security Acts, and have since been enacted in several nations around 
the world. This consensus may have been easier to achieve than the elusive 
consensus in the Receivables Convention, however, because a model law is “soft 
law”—none of its provisions are mandatory on States, which can pick and choose 
among its provisions. 
 
 
(2018). 
 5.  One example of such a regime is Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the United 
States.  U.C.C. § 9-109(a) provides that Article 9 governs not only transactions creating security interests 
in personal property or fixtures but also outright sales of four types of rights to payment—accounts, 
chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes.  See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1)–(3) (AM. LAW INST. 
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010). 
 6.  See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF RECEIVABLES IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, ch. IV, art. 22–23, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.14 (2004).  
 7.  See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, U.N. Sales 
No. E.09.V.12 (2007). 
 8.  See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS: 
SUPPLEMENT ON SECURITY RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, U.N. Sales No. E.11.V.6 (2010). 
 9.  See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL GUIDE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURITY RIGHTS 
REGISTRY, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.6 (2014). 
 10.  See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, U.N. Sales No. 
E.17.V.1 (2016) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW].  
 11.  See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, GUIDE TO 
ENACTMENT (2017).   
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Even as soft law, however, the Model Law and domestic enactments of it have 
not yet swept the world, and even optimists would have difficulty concluding that 
the legal regimes based on the Model Law will come to dominate secured 
transactions law in the near future. Most nations have not yet taken the plunge 
to move to a comprehensive and systematic notice-filing based system, and those 
that have already adopted such systems, such as the United States,12 the 
Anglophone provinces of Canada,13 Australia,14 and New Zealand,15 often with 
more detail or nuance, may not be eager to abandon their regimes for the 
somewhat more generic regime envisioned by the Model Law. More likely in the 
near future is a patchwork, with many States having modern regimes, but with 
the regimes differing in important respects, and many States retaining their 
current systems. Yet, an ever-increasing number of secured transactions touch 
more than one State, making the differences between secured transactions 
regimes of more than academic interest. Not only are there significant differences 
between older civil law and common law systems and more modern systems, such 
as U.C.C. Article 9 in the United States or the Model Law in a State that enacts 
it, but there are also some important differences between the regime created by 
Article 9—or the Canadian, Australian, or New Zealand variations on it—and 
that envisioned by the Model Law.16 
Accordingly, in the early twenty-first century, we find ourselves with a steady 
pace toward modernization of secured transactions law along the lines of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, but actual harmonization of the law, with no material 
differences from one State to the next, appears to be only a gleam in the 
distance.17 
A second development, however, puts pressure on the legal world of secured 
transactions. With increased ease of cross-border communication and commerce, 
there are fewer barriers to international secured transactions than in the past. 
 
 12.  See generally U.C.C. art. 9 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010). 
 13.  See, e.g., Saskatchewan Personal Property Security Act, 1993 (enacted in substantially similar 
form in all provinces of Canada except Quebec). 
 14.  See Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth). 
 15.  See Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (N.Z.).  
 16.  Differences include whether registration may be used to establish third-party effectiveness of a 
security right in collateral such as money and deposit accounts (Article 9 does not recognize registration 
in those cases, except when the money or deposit account is proceeds of other collateral, while the Model 
Law does recognize it), the types of assets in which special priority is accorded to a purchase-money 
security interest (Article 9 limits the category to goods, while the Model Law, which refers to the right as 
an acquisition security right, includes intellectual property), and whether self-help repossession of 
tangible collateral, so long as it can be accomplished without breach of the peace, is generally available 
to the secured creditor after the grantor’s default (this is the case in Article 9, but the Model Law limits 
availability of self-help to situations in which grantor has consented in writing to the secured creditor 
obtaining possession without applying to a court or other authority, the secured creditor has given the 
grantor and anyone else in possession of the collateral notice of default and of the secured creditor’s 
intent to obtain possession, and the person in possession of the encumbered asset does not object at the 
time of the secured creditor’s attempt to repossess). Moreover, as discussed at length in this article, the 
regimes differ significantly with respect to their conflict of laws rules. 
 17.  This is not to minimize the importance of developments to date; twenty-five years ago, even the 
idea of such a gleam seemed far-fetched. 
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These developments put more pressure than ever before on the conflict of 
laws rules that are part of a State’s secured transactions regime. Indeed, there are 
two very distinct types of pressure. First, so long as there are important 
differences between secured transactions regimes, it is critical to have a set of 
rules to determine which State’s legal regime will apply to particular issues in a 
secured transaction. Moreover, these rules are relevant and necessary not only if 
and when a dispute arises with respect to a secured transaction and a court or 
other tribunal must determine which State’s law is applicable, but also at the time 
a transaction is entered into—or, even earlier, when it is planned and 
documented—so that parties understand which rules must be followed and assess 
the effect of those rules in pricing their transactions. 
Second, even if differences between secured transactions regimes lessen over 
time, one important difference will remain until modern regimes decide to use a 
single common transnational registry—the identity of the State in whose registry 
to file a financing statement or other notice. For example, the internal, or local,18 
law of New York provides that most of these filings are to be made in the office 
of New York’s secretary of state,19 while the internal law of Jamaica states that 
filings are to be made in Jamaica’s Security Interests Registry.20 In which State’s 
registry should the filing be made in the case of a multi-State transaction touching 
both New York and Jamaica? The answer depends on which State’s law governs 
the perfection of the security interest—a conflict of laws question. 
One could be forgiven for assuming that the Model Law, which can trace its 
lineage to U.C.C. Article 9, would have conflict of laws rules nearly identical to 
those in Article 9, but that assumption would be mistaken. Rather, the conflict of 
laws rules of the two regimes differ in several important respects. As a result, in 
many important areas, the State whose law will govern important issues in a 
secured transaction according to Article 9 will be different than the State whose 
law will govern according to the conflict of laws rules in the Model Law. Thus, 
the State in which any litigation takes place is critical, since it is under that State’s 
conflict of laws rules that the conflict of law decision will be made. 
This article consists largely of a comparative analysis of the conflict of laws 
rules under the Model Law and those under U.C.C. Article 9, identifying areas 
of similarity and difference and how those differences can wreak havoc with 
transactional planning and litigation.21 In particular, this article examines conflict 
 
 18.  Restatement of the Law (Second), Conflict of Laws, defines “local law” of a State as “the body 
of standards, principles and rules, exclusive of its rules of Conflict of Laws, which the courts of that state 
apply in the decision of controversies brought before them.” Id. § 4(1). 
 19.  N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 9-501(a)(2) (McKinney 2013).  
 20.  Jamaica Security Interests in Personal Property Act § 47 (2013).  
 21.  The conflict of laws rules in U.C.C. Article 9 (and, when applicable, elsewhere in the U.C.C.) 
have been chosen as the comparison point for the conflict of laws regime of the Model Law both because 
it is likely that Article 9 currently governs more secured transactions than any other single legal regime 
and because the differences between the Article 9 conflict of laws rules and those in the Model Law are 
more significant than the differences between the Canadian, Australian, or New Zealand rules and those 
in the Model Law. 
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of laws rules with respect to four issues of substantial importance—creation of a 
security right, third-party effectiveness (perfection) of such a security right, 
priority of a security right as against competing claimants, and enforcement of 
the security right. 
The Article 9 regime and the Model Law conceptualize the questions that 
their conflict of laws regimes must address in similar, but not identical, ways. As 
a result, the choice of law rules that correspond to those issues are largely parallel 
to each other, but do not line up with each other exactly. Despite the lack of exact 
correspondence, however, it is easy to compare the two regimes and note their 
differences. 
The examination that follows compares the conflict of laws rules in Article 9 
and the Model Law from a comparative, rather than conceptual, framework.22  
Accordingly, the observations and conclusions set forth in this article are gleaned 
from the perspective of a desire for harmonization around rules that are 
acceptable to both regimes and practical in their operation. Thus, this article 
compares the two models primarily in terms of their workability and 
acceptability, noting aspects of each regime that are unlikely to be useful as the 
basis for harmonization. This is because harmonization of conflict of laws rules 
for secured transactions can reduce some of the unpredictability and forum-
shopping that can otherwise arise from the presence of inconsistent regimes. 
Importantly, the Working Group that prepared the Model Law spent 
comparatively little time discussing and debating the conflict of laws chapter and 
the number of States that participated actively in the debate was rather small. 
This is unfortunate because, as this paper demonstrates, there are serious 
workability issues associated with the conflict of laws provisions in the Model 
Law, and the lack of harmonization between those provisions and other existing 
provisions in modern regimes will result in unnecessary tension among modern 
secured transactions systems. 
A. Creation of a Security Right 
The first point of comparison of the regimes’ conflict of laws rules relates to 
the differences between the choice of law rules governing the creation of a 
security right. The Model Law distinguishes the law governing the creation of a 
security right qua property right from the law governing the mutual rights and 
obligations of the parties to the security agreement, with the law governing the 
former being determined by a mandatory choice of law rule, while the law 
governing the latter is determinable by agreement of the parties. Article 9 does 
not draw this distinction, with the law governing both issues being determinable 
by agreement—although the range of possible agreements differs slightly from 
 
 22.  Professor Charles Mooney has thoughtfully analyzed these rules from a conceptual framework 
in Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Choice-of-law Rules for Secured Transactions: An Interest-Based and Modern 
Principles-Based Framework for Assessment, 22 UNIFORM L. REV. 842 (2018). His analysis is essential 
reading for anyone interested in understanding the internal dynamics and competing interests at play in 
determining optimal choice of law rules.  
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the range under the Model Law. 
1. Model Law—Security Right as Property Right 
Article 85 of the Model Law generally provides that the creation of a security 
right in a tangible asset is governed by the law of the State in which the asset is 
located. One exception relates to assets of a type ordinarily used in more than 
one State; creation of a security right in such assets is governed by the law of the 
State in which the grantor is located.23 Another exception relates to tangible 
assets in transit at the time of putative creation of the security right or intended 
to be relocated to a State other than the State in which it is located at that time; 
the Model Law allows creation of a security right in such assets either under the 
law of the State in which the asset is located at the time of putative creation or 
under the law of the State of the asset’s ultimate destination, provided that the 
asset reaches that State within a short time after the time of the putative creation 
of the security right.24 The law governing creation of security rights in non-
intermediated securities, even if in tangible form, is dealt with separately in 
Article 100. All of these rules are mandatory; that is, they cannot be changed by 
agreement of the parties. 
Article 86 of the Model Law provides that the creation of a security right in 
an intangible asset is the law of the State in which the grantor is located. 
Exceptions are provided for security rights in rights to payment of funds credited 
to a bank account, intellectual property, and non-intermediated securities that 
are not in tangible form.25 
2. Model Law—Mutual Rights and Obligations 
Article 84 of the Model Law provides that the law applicable to the mutual 
rights and obligations of the grantor and the secured creditor arising from their 
security agreement is the law chosen by them and, in the absence of a choice of 
law, the law governing the security agreement. Read in isolation, Article 84 
would seem to provide for unlimited party autonomy in choice of law for this 
topic. Some limits on party autonomy, however, result from Article 93 of the 
Model Law. Under Article 93, courts may apply “overriding mandatory 
provisions of the law of the forum”26 and, in some cases, of another State,27and 
may exclude the application of a provision of the law chosen by the parties if the 
result of its application would be manifestly incompatible with fundamental 
notions of public policy (ordre public) of the forum28 and, in some cases, of 
another State.29 
 
 23.  See infra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between debtor location 
rules in the Model Law and those in Article 9). 
 24.  See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, ch. VIII, art. 85. 
 25.  See id. art. 87, 97–100. 
 26.  See id. art. 93. 
 27.  See id. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  See id. 
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3. U.C.C. Article 9 
In U.C.C. §§ 9-301 through 9-307, Article 9 provides a series of choice of law 
rules governing perfection, the effect of perfection or non-perfection, and priority 
of security interests. No rules are provided in Article 9, however, for 
determination of the law governing creation of a security interest or the law 
governing mutual rights and obligations of the parties. As a result, in the absence 
of any rules in Article 9 that govern these issues, the general choice of law rules 
in Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code apply to the determination of the 
governing law. These choice of law rules are found in U.C.C. § 1-301, which 
provides for a significant degree of party autonomy in selecting the State whose 
law governs matters within its scope, allowing parties to select a State whose law 
is to govern as long as the transaction bears a “reasonable relation” to that State.30  
No definition of the term “reasonable relation” is provided, but the term is 
generally understood to require a relationship that is, at the least, non-trivial. 
U.C.C. § 1-301 provides a secondary rule for the unusual cases in which the 
parties have not designated the State whose law is to govern. In those cases, the 
forum state’s law governs so long as the transaction bears an “appropriate 
relation” to the transaction.31 That phrase is typically understood as an indirect 
reference to the rules that the state would apply under its non- U.C.C. choice of 
law rules.32 
4. Differences between Model Law and U.C.C. Article 9 
There are several major differences between the Model Law and Article 9 
with respect to their rules governing the determination of the law applicable to 
issues relating to creation of a security right. First, the Model Law’s choice of law 
rules for creation of a security right differ from the rules applicable to the mutual 
rights and obligations of the grantor and the secured creditor, with the former set 
of rules being mandatory and not subject to contrary agreement by the parties, 
while the latter set are subject to broad discretion of the parties. In contrast, 
Article 9 does not distinguish between these issues, and both are subject to 
agreement by the parties. 
Second, the mandatory choice of law rule in the Model Law for determining 
the law that governs creation of a security right in tangible assets can lead to 
situations in which creation issues in a single transaction are governed by the laws 
of different States with different, and possibly inconsistent, requirements. 
Consider, for example, a grantor that grants a security right in all of its inventory, 
wherever located, to a secured party. If that inventory is located in more than one 
State, the law of different States will govern the creation issue, depending on the 
State in which a particular item of inventory is located. A single security 
agreement may not suffice if the formal requirements in one State differ from 
 
 30.  U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2008). 
 31.  Id. § 1-301(b). 
 32.  See Kenneth C. Kettering, Harmonizing Choice of Law in Article 9 with Emerging International 
Norms, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 246 (2010). 
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those in another. Moreover, if the security right is to cover future inventory, 
predictions as to where that inventory will be located may be inaccurate, creating 
a risk that the security right with respect to that inventory will not be created 
because the creation requirements of the State in which that inventory is located 
have not been satisfied. 
Third, the distinction in the Model Law between the law governing creation 
of a security right and the law governing the mutual rights and obligations of the 
parties can lead to the law of different States governing these issues. This is 
almost certain to occur in transactions in which a security right is granted in 
tangible assets located in more than one State. The security agreement will likely 
designate the State whose law governs mutual rights and obligations, and that 
State will match the location of only some (if any) of the tangible assets. It may 
also frequently occur in transactions involving intangible collateral because the 
law governing the creation of the security right will be the law of the State in 
which the grantor is located, while the secured creditor may insist on the law of 
the State of its location (or another creditor-friendly State) for mutual rights and 
obligations of the parties. Such a split between the law governing creation of the 
security right and the law governing mutual rights and obligations is unlikely to 
occur in the Article 9 framework. While nothing in U.C.C. § 1-301 prevents 
parties from exercising dépeçage and selecting the law of one State to govern 
creation of the security interest as a property right and the law of another State 
to govern mutual rights and obligations, there appears to be no practice of doing 
so, perhaps because it is not typical for U.S. parties to distinguish between the 
law governing creation of the right and the law governing the mutual obligations 
that inhere in that right. 
B. Third-Party Effectiveness/Perfection of a Security Interest 
Rules governing third-party effectiveness—in other words, perfection—and 
priority are the heart of any secured transactions regime; correspondingly, 
conflict of laws rules that determine the State whose law governs effectiveness 
against third parties and priority are most important segment of the conflict of 
laws rules with respect to secured transactions. After all, for the international 
system to work most efficiently, the answer to the question of which law governs 
perfection and priority should be the same no matter where it is asked and which 
State’s court answers it. Even if two States have both enacted modern secured 
transactions laws along the lines of Article 9 or the Model Law, their laws 
governing perfection of non-possessory security interests will differ in one key 
respect—the law of State A will call for a filing to be made in a registry 
maintained on behalf of State A, while the law of State B will call for a filing to 
be made in a registry maintained on behalf of State B.33 Thus, if the conflict of 
laws rules in some States point to the law of State A as governing perfection while 
 
 33.  Perhaps at some point in the distant future, general international secured transactions registries 
will replace those organized under domestic law, but the likelihood of this occurring in the near future 
seems small. 
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the conflict of laws rules of other States point to the law of State B, a secured 
creditor will need to file in both registries in order to be confident that its security 
right will be held to be perfected under both conflict of laws rules. 
Similarly, because secured creditors decide whether to extend credit, and on 
what terms, based on the priority that their security rights will have vis-à-vis 
competing claimants for the same collateral under applicable law, a chaotic world 
in which the applicable law—and, therefore, the priority of their security rights—
depends on which State’s court is adjudicating the matter adds uncertainty and 
risk to transactions even when the legal systems of the relevant States provide 
clear answers to questions of priority. 
Accordingly, the advantages of a world in which the State whose law is 
applied to questions of perfection and priority is the same no matter where those 
questions are litigated would be significant. One might hope and expect that 
Article 9 and the Model Law create such a world, but those hopes and 
expectations would quickly be dashed. Rather than providing the same rules for 
determining the law applicable to perfection and priority issues, these competing 
regimes differ in several important respects. 
The biggest, and most fundamental, difference in the conflict of laws rules 
between those of Article 9 and those of the Model Law relates to the law 
governing perfection. There are some notable differences with respect to the law 
that governs security rights in intangible collateral, but they are dwarfed by the 
differences with respect to the law that governs security rights in tangible assets. 
1. Intangible Assets 
Under Article 86 of the Model Law, perfection of security rights in intangible 
assets is governed by the law of the State in which the grantor is located. This 
does not seem dramatically different from the rule in Article 9, which, under 
U.C.C. § 9-301(1), is that perfection is governed by the law of the State in which 
debtor is located. The rules use different terminology, with the Model Law 
referring to “effectiveness against third parties” and “grantor[s],” while Article 9 
refers to “perfection” and “debtor[s],” but the difference so far is only in the 
wording. The rules differ, however, with respect to how the grantor/debtor’s 
location is determined. In Article 90, the Model Law provides two sets of rules 
for determining a grantor’s location, one for a grantor that has a place of business 
and one for a grantor who does not. A grantor that has one place of business is 
located in the State in which that place of business is located,34 while a grantor 
that has more than one place of business is located “in the State in which the 
central administration of the grantor is exercised.”35 A grantor that has no place 
of business is located in the State in which in it has his or her habitual residence.36 
Article 9, on the other hand, has a general location rule for debtors and a 
series of special rules that frequently override the general rule. The general 
 
 34.  See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, ch. VIII, art. 90. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id.  
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location rule is similar to, but not quite the same as the general rule in the Model 
Law. Under the general location rule in U.C.C. § 9-307(b), a debtor who is an 
individual is located at the individual’s principal residence.37 A debtor that is an 
organization is located at its place of business38 and, if it has more than one place 
of business, at its chief executive office.39 
Comparing the two sets of rules, we see some similarities and some important 
differences. In the case of an organization with only one place of business, the 
Model Law location rule is essentially identical to the general rule in Article 9. 
Under the Model Law, that organization is located in the State in which that place 
of business is located, and under the Article 9 general rule, the organization is 
located at its place of business. Similarly, in the case of an individual who does 
not have a place of business, the rules are nearly identical. Under the Model Law, 
that debtor is located in the State of his or her “habitual residence,” and under 
the Article 9 general rule that debtor is located in the State of his or her “principal 
residence.” It does not seem likely that the difference in phraseology between 
“habitual residence” and “principal residence” will generate different results. 
A difference that is perhaps slightly more significant appears in the case of an 
organization that has more than one place of business. Under the Model Law, 
that organization is located in the State in which its central administration is 
exercised;40 under the Article 9 general rule, that organization is located at its 
chief executive office.41 It does not appear that there would be many occasions in 
which the State in which an organization’s central administration is exercised is 
different that the State in which its chief executive office is located, although 
there might be some room for different results if the office of the organization’s 
chief executive is in a different State than that in which central administration is 
generally exercised. Perhaps this is possible in a world of telecommuting and 
multiple electronically linked offices. 
The biggest difference, however, between the Model Law location rule for 
debtors and the Article 9 general rule arises in the case of an individual who has 
one or more places of business. Under the Model Law, the location rule for such 
an individual is the same as the location rule for an organization that has one or 
more places of business—the individual is located at his or her only place of 
business or, if he or she has more than one place of business, the place of central 
administration.42 Under the Article 9 general rule, however, an individual is 
located at his or her principal residence regardless of whether or where that 
individual does business.43 So, for example, in the case of an individual whose 
principal residence is in France, but whose only place of business is in 
 
 37.  U.C.C. § 9-307(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2010). 
 38.  Id. § 9-307(b)(2). 
 39.  Id. § 9-307(b)(3). 
 40.  See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, ch. VIII, art. 90.  
 41.  U.C.C. § 9-307(b)(3).  
 42.  See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, ch. VIII, art. 90.  
 43.  U.C.C. § 9-307(b)(1). 
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Switzerland, the individual would be located in Switzerland under the Model Law 
location rule, but in France under the Article 9 general rule. 
U.C.C. § 9-307 contains several special rules for determining a debtor’s 
location that override the general rule described above. Two of those rules are of 
particular importance. First, under U.C.C. § 9-307(e), a “registered 
organization”—a U.S. domestic corporation or similar juridical entity44—is 
located in its U.S. state of organization, even if its chief executive office is in 
another U.S. state or in a foreign State. This rule can, quite obviously, make a 
dramatic difference in determining, under Article 9, which law governs perfection 
of a security interest. A debtor that is, for example, a Delaware LLC but whose 
chief executive office or place of central administration is in the Bahamas is 
located in the Bahamas under the Model Law but in Delaware under Article 9. 
The number of entities of this sort (organized under the law of a U.S. state but 
with the chief executive office outside the United States) is believed to be rather 
small, however. As a result, the biggest impact of the location rule in  
U.C.C. § 9-307(e) is to change the location of a U.S. registered organization from 
the U.S. state where its chief executive office is located to the U.S. state under 
whose laws it is organized. 
A second special rule is found in U.C.C. § 9-307(c). Under that rule, a debtor 
that would be found to be located outside the United States under the rule of 
U.C.C. § 9-307(b) (and whose location is not changed by application of other 
special rules such as the rule for registered organizations under U.C.C. § 9-
307(e)) will, nonetheless, not be treated as located in the foreign State unless the 
foreign State is one “whose law generally requires information concerning the 
existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally available in a 
filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or result of the security 
interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the 
collateral.” A State that has perfection rules like those in Article 9 or in the 
Model Law will pass this “test,” but so-called non-filing jurisdictions will not. If 
the debtor’s location under U.C.C. § 9-307(b) is in a State that “fails” the test in 
subsection (c), the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.45 As a result, 
because under U.C.C. § 9-301 the law governing perfection of a non-possessory 
security interest is that of the debtor’s location, perfection of a security interest 
granted by a debtor that would otherwise be located outside the U.S. may be 
governed by the law of the District of Columbia and requires the filing of a 
financing statement there. There is no analog to this rule in the Model Law choice 
of law rules. Rather, under those rules, perfection of a security interest in 
intangible assets is governed by the law of the debtor’s location whether or not 
that State’s domestic law provides for perfection by filing. 
Summarizing briefly—for intangible collateral, both the Model Law and 
Article 9 refer matters governing perfection and priority to the State in which the 
 
 44.  See id. § 9-102(a)(71). 
 45.  Id. § 9-307(c). 
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debtor is located. There are important differences in these conflict of laws rules, 
however, that spring from different rules that determine a debtor’s location. 
2. Tangible Collateral 
In the case of a non-possessory security interest in tangible collateral, the 
differences between the conflict of laws rules of the two systems is substantial. 
Under the general rule in Article 85(1) of the Model Law, perfection and priority 
of a security right in a tangible asset are governed by the law of the State in which 
the asset is located. Under Article 9, however, while priority of a security interest 
in tangible collateral is governed by the law of the State in which the asset is 
located, perfection of such a security interest is governed by the law of the State 
in which the debtor is located. 46 This rule, part of Article 9 since 2001, has 
substantial practical advantages in transactions in which a debtor grants a blanket 
security interest in tangible assets such as inventory or equipment that are located 
in a large number of U.S. states. Under former Article 9, which was similar to the 
Model Law in this regard, perfection of a security interest in tangible collateral 
was governed by the law of the state in which the collateral was located. As a 
result, an extension of credit secured by tangible collateral located in all fifty U.S. 
states required fifty separate state filings in order for all of the security interests 
to be perfected. Indeed, it was a desire to avoid such costly and duplicative fifty-
state filings that was a primary motivating factor in changing the Article 9 conflict 
of laws rule from one that looked to the location of the collateral to one that looks 
at the location of the debtor. 
The result of this change, however, is that, under the Article 9 conflict of laws 
rules, perfection of a security interest in tangible collateral may be governed by 
the law of one jurisdiction while priority of that security interest may be governed 
by the law of a different jurisdiction. This is not problematic in the United States, 
where the perfection issue boils down to a question of which state is the proper 
state in which to file a standardized form that is essentially the same in every U.S. 
state, where priority rules are substantially identical, and where the dividing line 
between perfection and priority is clear. 
When one of the jurisdictions involved is not a U.S. state, however, but, 
rather, is a foreign State, one or more of those statements may not be true. In 
that case, applying the U.S. bifurcated conflict of laws rule for nonpossessory 
security interests in tangible assets can be problematic. Add to that the fact that 
a tribunal outside the U.S. applying the Model Law conflict of laws rules for 
perfection and priority would almost certainly reach different conclusions as to 
the applicable law, and it is clear that the difference between Article 9 and the 
Model Law in this regard is a recipe for chaos. 
 
 46.  See id. § 9-301(1) (general rule indicating that the law governing perfection and priority is the 
law of the state in which the debtor is located) and § 9-301(3)(C) (special rule for priority of non-
possessory security interest in tangible collateral indicating that the law governing priority of such a 
security interest is the law of the state in which the collateral is located). 
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II 
ENFORCEMENT 
No simple choice of law principle seems fully to do justice in the context of 
enforcement. This is the case, in no small part, because the secured transactions 
law of “enforcement,” unlike that of third-party effectiveness (perfection) or 
priority, is not a rule or set of rules that answers a single question. Rather, the 
questions addressed by the law of enforcement47 include, at least, the following 
five issues, and it is far from clear that a single choice of law rule should determine 
the law governing all of them: 
1. How and when the secured party may obtain physical possession of 
tangible collateral (including whether this may be accomplished extra-
judicially through “self-help”); 
2. How and when the secured party may dispose of collateral (including 
whether this may be accomplished extra-judicially, competing 
claimants’ rights to be notified, etc.); 
3. Under what circumstances, if any, other secured parties (or other 
competing claimants) may take over the enforcement promise; 
4. How the proceeds of disposition must be distributed (to other secured 
parties, other competing claimants, etc.); 
5. What remedies are available to an aggrieved party.48 
A. Law Applicable to Enforcement under the Model Law 
Neither the Model Law nor Article 9 is completely satisfactory in the 
application of its conflict of laws rules to these issues. The Model Law remits all 
enforcement issues with respect to tangible collateral to the law of the State in 
which the collateral is located at the time of commencement of enforcement.49  
Tying the law governing enforcement to the location of the collateral certainly 
makes sense for some issues. For example, it seems wholly appropriate that, when 
collateral is located in a State that, out of concern for the public order, does not 
allow self-help repossession, the secured party should not be able to obtain 
possession of the collateral without the debtor’s consent and without going to 
court, even if the parties have agreed that their mutual rights and obligations are 
governed by the law of a different State. 
The rule in the Model Law is problematic, however, in its application to some 
self-help repossession scenarios and curious in many other enforcement 
scenarios. First, the converse of the self-help example in the previous paragraph 
suggests that the law of the situs of the collateral at the time of commencement 
of enforcement may not be the appropriate law to govern the availability of self-
 
 47.  For this purpose, this article uses “the law of enforcement” to refer to the law governing the 
matters covered in Part 6 of U.C.C. Article 9 or Chapter VII of the Model Law. See U.C.C. §§ 9-601–624; 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, ch. VII. 
 48.  See supra note 47. 
 49.  See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, ch. VIII, art. 88. 
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help repossession. Consider a debtor and secured party, both located in State X, 
who have agreed that their mutual rights and obligations are to be governed by 
the law of State X, which does not allow extra-judicial repossession. Assume that, 
at the time of the debtor’s default, some of the collateral happens to be located 
in State Y which allows self-help repossession. Should this mean that the secured 
creditor can exercise self-help to repossess the collateral even though the legal 
system with respect to which the secured creditor and grantor entered into their 
agreement does not provide for that remedy? That would be a rather difficult 
position to defend. 
Second, tying the law governing enforcement of a security interest in tangible 
collateral to the location of the collateral at the time of commencement of 
enforcement can bring about questionable results in the case of non-possessory 
security interests in tangible collateral. A debtor that realizes that it is on the 
verge of default can unilaterally determine the law governing enforcement of the 
security interest in easily-transported collateral by simply moving it to another 
State, presumably one with an enforcement regime that favors the interest of the 
debtor. Under the rule in the Model Law, there is nothing that the secured party 
can do to prevent this. The security agreement can make such relocation an event 
of default, but that is little solace to a secured creditor who already had other 
grounds on which to declare default and, in any event, the default does not 
relocate the law governing enforcement to the previous location. Similarly, while 
the Model Law provides that “[a] person must exercise its rights and perform its 
obligations under this Law in good faith and in a commercially reasonable 
manner,”50 it is not clear whether the debtor’s transportation of the collateral 
would violate this standard and, if so, what sort of remedy a court might award in 
order to protect the secured party’s interests. The risk of strategic relocation of 
collateral such as equipment is probably low. After all, equipment is typically 
used in premises owned or leased by the equipment’s owner and often in a setting, 
such as a factory or office, where it is used in conjunction with other equipment. 
A debtor that is insolvent, or close to it, is unlikely to be able to easily find a 
substitute premises in another State in which its equipment can be productively 
used. If, however, the collateral is inventory, moving it to a State in which the 
secured creditor cannot repossess it quickly could be attractive to a debtor who 
believes that the extra time will be beneficial to it. 
Third, inasmuch as the law governing enforcement of a security interest in 
tangible collateral determines some rights of third parties in the enforcement 
process, this conflict of laws rule means that those parties not only have no 
control of the law governing their rights ab initio, but also have no ability to 
prevent changes in that law even after they may have extended credit or 
otherwise relied on the law of the location of the collateral at that time. The 
enforcement chapter of the Model Law governs not only secured creditor and 
debtor behavior during the enforcement process but also matters of critical 
 
 50.  Id. ch. IV, art. 4. 
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economic importance to third parties such as the distribution of proceeds of 
disposition.51 Thus, potential changes in those rules, resulting from a change in 
the location of the collateral, adds to the risk borne by those third parties in a 
way that does not appear to be justified by any policy. 
Fourth, the Model Law provides no guidance as to what constitutes 
“commencement” of enforcement. Perhaps no guidance is needed if one assumes 
that all foreclosures proceed judicially; in those cases, taking the action necessary 
to commence the judicial foreclosure procedure would seem to constitute 
commencement of enforcement. If the secured creditor proceeds extra-judicially, 
however, what constitutes commencement of enforcement? Does enforcement 
commence when the secured creditor takes possession of the encumbered asset 
or when it first attempts to do so, even if unsuccessfully? What if, before 
repossession or an attempt at it, the secured creditor sent a letter to the grantor 
stating that the grantor is in default under the security agreement and demanding 
that the grantor make the encumbered assets available to the secured creditor so 
that the secured creditor can easily take possession of them? Does that constitute 
commencement of enforcement, locking in the governing law, or can the debtor 
obtain better rules by quickly moving the collateral to a more debtor-friendly 
State?  The Model Law provides no guidance. 
The Model Law conflict of laws rule for enforcement of a security right in 
intangible collateral causes less difficulty. Under that rule, which appears in 
Article 88(b) of the Model Law, the law governing enforcement of a security right 
in an intangible asset is the law that governs the priority of that security right. 
This rule is less troubling for a number of reasons. For one thing, issues relating 
to repossession are absent in the case of intangible collateral—which, by its 
nature, cannot physically be possessed—so the law governing enforcement of a 
security right in such collateral primarily relates to the disposition and 
distribution process. Second, it is somewhat more difficult for a debtor to change 
its location—the determinant of the law governing priority and, thus, the law 
governing enforcement of a security right in intangible collateral—on the eve of 
enforcement than to relocate tangible collateral. Finally, while there does not 
appear to be any particular reason to tie the law governing enforcement with 
respect to intangible collateral to the grantor’s location, it does not appear that 
any other connecting factor, other than perhaps the law selected by the parties, 
would be preferable. 
When the collateral consists of both tangible and intangible assets, the Model 
Law rules present an additional difficulty. Because the rule that determines the 
law governing enforcement of the security right in the tangible assets is different 
than the rule for intangible assets, it may be the case that different bodies of law 
govern enforcement with respect to tangible and intangible assets in which a 
security right has been granted. In cases in which the secured creditor seeks to 
dispose of both intangible and tangible encumbered assets in the same 
 
 51.  Id. ch. VII, art. 79. 
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transaction, this may result in two different (and possibly inconsistent) legal 
systems governing the same act of disposition. 
B. Law Applicable to Enforcement under U.C.C. Article 9 
Article 9’s conflict of laws rules for determining which law governs 
enforcement of a security interest have some difficulties as well. Conflict of laws 
rules for enforcement are not addressed in U.C.C. § 9-301, so the general U.C.C. 
conflict of laws provision— U.C.C. § 1-301—provides the relevant conflict of laws 
rule. Section 1-301 allows parties to select the law governing their transaction if 
the transaction bears a reasonable relation to the State whose law is selected.52  
Does this mean that, if parties select as governing law the law of a State that 
allows self-help repossession, such repossession is allowed even inside a State that 
does not allow such self-help out of concern for the public order? This should not 
be the case. Indeed, such self-help might be seen as violating a fundamental policy 
of the State in which it occurs. If litigation about the repossession occurs in that 
State, and that State, like the Model Law, has a “fundamental policy” override to 
otherwise-applicable choice of law rules, the State might provide some relief, 
albeit after the fact. It should be noted in this regard, however, that no such 
provision appears in the text of the conflict of laws rules in U.C.C. Article 1,53 
although many believe that such a rule, which appears in Restatement of Conflict 
of Laws (Second) § 187, is implicit or that such a limitation is applicable to U.C.C. 
transactions through U.C.C. § 1-103(b), which allows supplementation of U.C.C. 
rules by common law principles in some contexts. What happens, however, if 
litigation about enforcement occurs in a U.S. state, and the choice of law clause 
selects the law of a State that provides fewer protections than under the U.C.C.? 
While many of the debtor protections in Article 9 are not waivable by contract, 
it is far from clear which, if any, of these are expressions of fundamental policy 
that cannot be avoided by a choice of law. 
There is probably no single ideal choice of law solution to these multiple 
issues that is not hopelessly complex. This is because the topic of enforcement 
embraces at least three distinct sorts of issues: 
1. Mutual rights and obligations between the grantor and the secured 
creditor. Governing these rights and obligations by the law chosen by 
the parties to govern their other mutual rights and obligations makes 
the most sense. 
2. Rules that protect third parties, such as required notices of proposed 
disposition, rights to complain about unreasonable dispositions that 
deprive competing claimants of the possibility of a surplus, etc. In some 
ways, governing these rights by the law that applies to perfection or 
priority seems to be the best fit inasmuch as those topics also address 
 
 52.  U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 2008).  
 53.  Such an exception was stated explicitly in the proposed 2001 text of Revised U.C.C. § 1-301, but 
that language was not enacted and was eventually removed from the Official Text of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
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third-party rights. But the laws governing perfection (under the 
Model Law) and priority (under both the Model Law and Article 9) 
are manipulable by the grantor in the case of tangible collateral by 
moving the collateral from State to State. It is not clear how this would 
apply to a situation in which a secured creditor takes possession of the 
collateral in State A and then moves it to State B, which has fewer 
protections for third-party claimants. This sort of manipulation would 
be troublesome if it impaired the rights of the grantor or competing 
claimants. Such unilateral manipulation would not be possible if third-
party rights were governed by the law applicable to the mutual rights 
and obligations of the grantor and secured creditor. 
3. Rules that protect the public order, such as rules limiting the ability of 
a secured creditor to obtain possession of the collateral extra-judicially.  
If the law of the State in which such actions would take place prohibits 
those actions, there is a strong case for applying the law of that State. 
III 
BRINGING THE SYSTEMS CLOSER TOGETHER 
As the above analysis demonstrates, the differences in choice of law rules 
between those that appear in Article 9 and those recommended by the Model 
Law present a serious obstacle to international secured transactions touching 
both the U.S. and a State that enacts the Model Law. In some cases, such as when 
the differing choice of law rules for creation of a security interest point to 
different States with different rules for creation, the differing rules will have the 
practical effect of forcing the parties to a secured transaction to take whatever 
steps, and follow whatever form, is necessary to satisfy the creation rules of more 
than one State. If the rules in the States pointed to by the Article 9 choice of law 
rules and the Model Law choice of law rules are essentially identical, the added 
cost is limited to the cost of determining the nature of both rules. If the rules of 
one State are more onerous than the other, but compliance with the more 
onerous rules will also satisfy the rules of the less onerous State, the additional 
cost of complying with the more onerous rule will be part of the parties’ cost 
analysis of a potential transaction. If the rules of one State are inconsistent with 
the rules of the other State, however, such that entirely different actions must be 
taken under the laws of each State to create a security interest, this duplicative 
action will, of course, add cost to a transaction. 
In cases in which the States pointed to by the different choice of law rules 
have non-identical rules governing perfection, the differing choice of law rules 
will have the practical effect of requiring secured creditors to take whatever steps 
are necessary under the laws of two or more States in order to perfect their 
security interests. This could be as simple as filing a notice with respect to a 
secured transaction in multiple registries in different States, or more complex if 
one or both of the States to which the competing conflict of laws rules points 
requires action other than the registration of a notice, such as notification of an 
account debtor. This duplicative action is wasteful and can add cost to a secured 
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transaction. At least, however, a secured creditor can determine in advance which 
perfection rules will apply under the differing choice of law rules and comply with 
all of them. 
In the case of priority rules, there is potential for more confusion. A creditor 
considering extending credit will need to consider, as well, all of the States in 
which the issue of priority might be litigated and assess, under the law applicable 
under the choice of law rules of each such State, its priority status as against 
competing claimants. If those priority rules differ, such a creditor might make a 
probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of litigation establishing priority 
occurring in one or the other of the possible forums with their differing choice of 
law rules; alternatively, such a creditor might, instead, simply choose to be risk 
averse and assume, for purposes of making credit decisions, that litigation will 
occur in the State whose choice of law rules point to the State whose law gives 
the creditor the lowest priority. Thus, the inconsistent choice of law rules can 
reduce access to credit or increase its cost. 
Finally, in the case of the rules governing enforcement of a security interest, 
the confusion may border on chaos. Neither the Article 9 choice of law rules nor 
those in the Model Law are models of clarity, and the Model Law rules are 
particularly unclear. Moreover, the potential for inconsistent and conflicting 
rules over a wide range of issues—repossession of collateral, disposition or 
collection of collateral, rights of third parties, distribution of proceeds, redress 
for violations—is high. 
Needless to say, this is not a good situation. The greatest tension will occur, 
of course, in transactions involving ab initio both the United States and a State 
that has enacted the conflict of laws provisions in the Model Law inasmuch as the 
forums of either State might be the locus of litigation. Even in the absence of such 
an obviously difficult situation, however, it is entirely possible that a transaction 
not initially involving both the United States and a Model Law State could 
nonetheless be litigated in such a State as the result of a peripatetic debtor or the 
movement of collateral. However the situation arises, the result in a dispute with 
significant economic stakes should not be determined by a party steering the 
dispute to a forum with conflict of laws rules favorable to its side. 
As a result, there would be significant benefit to harmonizing the conflict of 
laws rules of the two systems. In this spirit, it would be beneficial if UNCITRAL 
and the proprietors of the Uniform Commercial Code considered two sets of 
adjustments to their conflict of laws rules with respect to security rights to bring 
them in greater harmony with each other. The first set of proposed adjustments 
is with respect to the law governing enforcement of security rights, and the second 
is with respect to the law governing third-party effectiveness and priority of 
security rights in tangible collateral. The former recommendation will involve a 
greater adjustment to the Model Law, while the latter would require a small, but 
important, adjustment to the conflict of laws rules in Article 9. As with the 
general theme of this article, this suggestion is more pragmatic than conceptual, 
aiming for workability more than for purity. 
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A. Harmonization of Choice of Law Rules Concerning Enforcement 
As stated above, the Model Law’s conflict of laws rules for enforcement of a 
security right are problematic in significant respects. It appears that they were 
drafted with a focus on judicial repossession and disposition of collateral 
consisting of tangible assets, rather than on non-judicial repossession, intangible 
assets, and modern methods of disposition not connected to any particular place, 
such as disposition via Internet auctions. The Article 9 rules are not without 
difficulty, but they seem to have fewer difficulties than the rules in the Model 
Law. 
Both the Model Law and the Article 9 conflict of laws rules could benefit from 
some revision, with a result somewhat closer to the Article 9 rule than to the 
Model Law rule. In particular, both sets of rules could be revised to converge on 
the following principles: 
1. Except as noted in paragraph 2, all of the enforcement rules that 
govern the conduct of the secured creditor vis-à-vis the grantor, and 
their mutual rights and obligations, should be governed by the law 
governing their security agreement. This is essentially the rule under 
Article 9.54 
2. Even if, under the law governing the security agreement, a secured 
creditor can take possession of the collateral without applying to a 
court or similar tribunal, non-judicial repossession cannot take place 
if such repossession is not allowed under the law of the State in which 
the collateral is located. In other words, if either the law governing the 
security agreement or the law of the State in which the collateral is 
located does not allow non-judicial repossession, the secured creditor 
may not use this method of enforcement. This recognizes that the 
State in which the collateral is located has an interest in maintaining 
public order within its borders. 
3. The State whose law governs the security agreement should also 
govern the rights of third parties in the enforcement process.  It must 
be conceded, however, that analysis of this issue does not yield a clean, 
logical answer. After all, referring the issue to the law of the State in 
which tangible collateral is located, either at the time of 
commencement of enforcement (as under the Model Law), or at the 
time of any particular enforcement action, such as disposition or 
distribution of the proceeds, is capable of manipulation by either or 
both of the debtor and the secured party. Applying the law of the 
State whose law governs the security agreement is appealing, but third 
parties are not parties to the security agreement, so it would be 
fictional to base a choice for this rule on consent or agreement by the 
third parties. Referring the matter to the law of the State in which the 
 
 54.  See U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 2 (noting that this issue is governed by U.C.C. § 1-301, rather than the 
Article 9 choice of law rules). 
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debtor is located has some appeal as well, but the result could be that 
the rules governing disposition of the collateral and distribution of 
proceeds as between the secured party and debtor would be governed 
by the law of one State, while the rules governing the same issues 
between the secured party and third parties would be governed by the 
law of a different State. Since different States might have different and 
inconsistent rules governing disposition and distribution, this rule 
could prove unworkable. While none of these alternatives is without 
difficulty, having the State whose law governs the security agreement 
also govern the rights of third parties in the enforcement process may 
be the least difficult alternative inasmuch as it does not result in an 
odd and difficult form of dépeçage, in which two different, and 
possibly inconsistent, sets of rules would govern disposition and 
distribution depending on whether a court is looking at that process 
from the perspective of the debtor or from the perspective of third 
parties.55 
B. Harmonization of Choice of Law Rules Concerning Perfection and Priority 
with Respect to Tangible Collateral 
1. Subject to the principle stated in paragraph 2, consideration should be 
given to changing the Article 9 choice of law rule that determines the 
law governing perfection of security interests in tangible collateral to 
refer to the law of the State in which the collateral is located. This is 
the rule in the Model Law, as well as in a number of other States,56 
while the Article 9 rule under which perfection is governed by the law 
of the State in which the debtor is located has not attracted non-U.S. 
adherents. Accordingly, it is unlikely that harmonization will occur 
without this change. The effect of this change in the context of 
domestic transactions involving multiple U.S. states would be 
substantially ameliorated, however, by the principle stated in 
paragraph 2. 
2. In cases in which the tangible collateral is located in a state in the 
United States, the rule in paragraph 1 should be supplemented by an 
additional rule that redirects the governing law to the U.S. state in 
which the debtor is located under the Article 9 rules that determine 
the location of a debtor.57 For example, in the case of tangible 
collateral located in North Carolina and owned by a debtor that is a 
Delaware corporation, the principle in paragraph 1 would initially 
 
 55.  Professor Mooney takes a different view, opining that “the STCOL [secured transactions choice 
of law] rules under the Model Law that generally follow the rules for perfection and priority would better 
meet the interests of third parties.” Mooney, supra note 22.  
 56.  See, e.g., Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10, s. 5(1) (providing the choice of law 
rule in Ontario). 
 57.  See U.C.C. § 9-307. 
COHEN_CROSS REFERENCED PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2018  3:26 PM 
No. 1 2018]         PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS 223 
remit the topic of perfection to the law of North Carolina, but the 
principle in this paragraph would then redirect the choice of law 
determination to Delaware. The result of application of this principle 
would be that perfection of a security interest in tangible collateral 
located in a U.S. state would be governed by the same law as it is 
currently governed by under U.C.C. §§ 9-301 and 9-307.58 In addition, 
this two-step process would be consistent with the Model Law. Article 
95 of the Model Law provides that if the law applicable to an issue is 
the law of “a State that comprises one or more territorial units each 
of which has its own rules of law in respect of that issue,” then “[t]he 
internal conflict-of-laws rules of that State, or in the absence of such 
rules, of that territorial unit determine the relevant territorial unit 
whose substantive law is to apply.”59 In other words, for collateral 
located in the United States, the Model Law first remits the 
determination of the law governing perfection to the United States; 
then, the Model Law defers to the internal conflict of laws rules in the 
United States to determine which U.S. state will provide the law 
governing the issue. This proposal for Article 9 would be consistent 
with the Model Law approach yet also consistent with the current 
Article 9 status quo under which only one U.S. filing is required no 
matter how many U.S. states are the situs of tangible collateral. The 
primary effect of the proposal would be to eliminate the situation, 
rejected by other States, in which Article 9 concludes that the law of 
a U.S. state governs perfection of a security interest in tangible 
collateral located outside the United States. One additional tweak 
would be needed in order to make this a fully-functional rule under 
Article 9. The tweak relates to rather unusual situations in which 
tangible collateral is located in the United States but the debtor is, 
under U.C.C. § 9-307(b), located in a foreign jurisdiction that satisfies 
the test in U.C.C. § 9-307(c). In such a case, the current Article 9 rule 
provides that perfection is governed by the law of the foreign 
jurisdiction in which the debtor is located.60 Under the rule proposed 
here, in order to harmonize the U.S. rule under Article 9 with the 
Model Law, redirecting the issue to a non-U.S. jurisdiction would not 
occur. Accordingly, if the debtor is located outside the United States 
under current U.C.C. § 9-307, there would be a need for a rule to 
designate a U.S. jurisdiction, such as the District of Columbia, as the 
 
 58.  Kenneth Kettering has made a similar proposal. See Kettering, supra note 32, 259–61. 
 59.  UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, ch. VIII, art. 95.  
 60.  For example, in the case of collateral located in Maine owned by a debtor located in the province 
of New Brunswick under the location of debtor rules in U.C.C. § 9-307, current Article 9 provides that 
perfection of the security interest in that collateral is governed by the law of New Brunswick because the 
New Brunswick Personal Property Security Act would satisfy the test in U.C.C. § 9-307(c).  (If, under 
U.C.C. § 9-307(b), the debtor is located in a foreign jurisdiction that does not satisfy the test in subsection 
(c), the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.) 
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location of that debtor. Another possibility would be to provide that 
perfection of a security interest in such collateral is governed by the 
law of the U.S. state in which the collateral is located. This alternative 
rule does not involve an arbitrary designation, such as the designation 
of the District of Columbia, but could result in the need for multiple 
filings if the foreign debtor has collateral located in more than one 
U.S. state. 
3. A choice of law rule for perfection of security interests in tangible 
collateral along the lines of paragraphs 1 and 2 would yield results 
identical to current Article 9 in all but two situations. First, in the case 
of collateral located in a foreign jurisdiction owned by a debtor 
located in the United States, current Article 9 provides that perfection 
is governed by the law of the U.S. state in which the debtor is located, 
while the rule proposed here would remit the perfection issue to the 
law of the foreign jurisdiction.61 This would not cause significant 
disruption of transactional planning, however, inasmuch as thoughtful 
secured creditors today seek to be perfected under the law of a foreign 
State in which collateral is located because the conflict of laws rules 
of that State almost certainly would apply the law of that State to the 
perfection issue because the collateral is located there. Second, in the 
case of collateral located in the United States but owned by a debtor 
who, under U.C.C. § 9-307, is located outside the United States, 
current Article 9 provides that perfection is governed by the law of 
the foreign State in which the debtor is located, while the rule 
proposed here would govern perfection by the law of a U.S. state. 
Again, this would cause little disruption inasmuch as thoughtful 
secured creditors already take into account that litigation about 
perfection might occur in a State whose conflict of laws rules look to 
the location of the collateral. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
Until the unlikely event of world-wide harmonization of secured transactions 
laws, conflict of laws rules will remain a critically important part of the 
international secured transactions regime throughout the twenty-first century. If 
those rules were consistent with each other, parties to secured transactions would 
be able to predict with some degree of certainty which State’s law will apply to 
various aspects of a secured transaction. Unfortunately, that consistency is absent 
today. In particular, the conflict of laws rules in the UNCITRAL Model Law and 
in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States differ in 
 
 61.  Professor Mooney, who favors the current rule in Article 9, nonetheless notes that “support for 
the location-of-assignor rule [for tangible assets] is somewhat weaker than in the case of receivables.” 
Mooney, supra note 22. 
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important respects. This difference has the potential to add unnecessary 
uncertainty and expense to secured transactions. Moves toward harmonization 
of these conflict of laws rules, perhaps along the lines suggested in this article, 
would be beneficial. While they would not create substantive harmonization of 
secured transactions law across borders, they would add an important degree of 
predictability and certainty in our non-harmonized world. 
 
